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Abstract 
This research attempted to capture the creative aspects of government program 
management in three specific areas: efficiently navigating oversight, capturing the intent of 
regulations, and developing innovative risk management practices.  Respected acquisition 
leaders with diverse backgrounds and experiences were interviewed with ranks ranging from 
0-6 to 0-8 and GS-15 to SES.  Several contractor interviews were conducted for specific 
purposes.  The data were iteratively coded and analyzed using ATLAS.ti.  The results were 
categorized into four themes, each with three sub-elements.  Differences between 
respondents with program director experience and those with rapid acquisition experience 
are discussed.  A survey was then distributed to the interviewees and junior acquisition 
professionals.  The predominant research finding is that senior acquisition professionals 
believe that relationship-building is of paramount importance.  This, along with creative 
practices regarding how to externally communicate program strategies, greatly increases the 
probability of successfully navigating oversight and obtaining waivers or tailoring regulations.  
Various risk management techniques and management reserve techniques are presented.  In 
addition, knowledge gaps between the junior acquisition workforce and senior leaders were 
identified based on statistical significance and corrective actions recommended where 
applicable.  Reports and outbriefs were developed, tailored to each class, to relay these 
creative practices to junior acquisition professionals. 
Introduction 
This paper presents the results of exploratory thesis research regarding creative 
program management practices as identified by senior leaders.  For the purposes of this 
paper, creative is defined as any innovative, resourceful, uncommon, or out-of-the-box 
thinking and practices leading to efficient and effective program management without 
jeopardizing integrity, ethics, or laws.  The literature review identified three areas of 
investigation: 
Topic 1:  How to creatively reduce non value-added oversight 
Topic 2:  How to creatively capture the intent of regulations  
Topic 3:  Creative practices of resource-loaded risk management 
The first two topics are the focus of this paper because they led to the overarching 
findings.  Interviews with respected, leading practitioners representing diverse programs with 
                                                
1 This study is an original product developed from thesis research conducted at the Air Force Institute 
of Technology (AFIT) in partial fulfillment of a Master of Science in Research and Development 
Management.  This research has not been previously published and is not under consideration by 
another journal for publication. 
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varying sizes and complexity were conducted.  A survey was then distributed to government 
acquisitions personnel, further validating interview findings with quantitative data, as well as 
prioritizing responses from senior leaders and identifying the major differences in the junior 
workforce.  
Literature Review 
Perhaps the greatest impediment to the achievement of high quality—and 
productivity—is … burgeoning bureaucracy. 
(Augustine, 1997, p. 79) 
The type of oversight described in this paper must be defined because “oversight” 
can have various meanings based on the reader’s experiences.  For the purposes of this 
research, oversight consists of the organizations and people needed to approve (either 
formally or informally) a program’s approach and/or documentation to proceed to the next 
phase in the acquisition life cycle.  This is separate from government oversight of 
contractors or prime contractor oversight of subcontractors.  This research is not meant to 
make judgments as to the goodness of oversight or to assess the theory of checks and 
balances versus optimal efficiency.  The goal is to identify creative ways in which DoD 
acquisition oversight can be made more beneficial or, in situations when oversight is overly 
cumbersome, how it can be effectively navigated with minimal effort.   
Setting the Stage: Extensive Oversight—A Serious Issue 
Acquisition oversight began in the 1960s (Acker, 1993).  Numerous studies and 
reports on defense acquisition have subsequently been conducted over the past five 
decades.  A common theme extracted from these reports is that a serious problem exists 
with extensive, non-required, and, many times, non value-added oversight.  One panel of 
experts estimated the cost of oversight in Air Force programs to be as high as $94 million 
(Neal, 2004).  Knue’s (1991) thesis is recommended as a detailed source for explaining 
oversight of and within the DoD.  Additionally, several case studies exist on oversight within 
Air Force programs.  A few of the more prominent reports are summarized in the following 
paragraphs.   
Miller and Williams (1993) conducted a case study of oversight in the C-17 program.  
The interviews they conducted revealed that oversight had a negative effect on program 
management and morale.  There was “absolute certainty in the collective consciousness” of 
members of the C-17 program office that a link exists between oversight and its effect on 
cost and schedule performance (Knue, 1991, p. 72).  Interviewees also cited external 
(outside the chain of command) sources of oversight from nine distinct organizations that 
negatively affected the program.  These nine external sources did not include legislative, 
executive, and media oversight (Miller & Williams, 1993). 
A RAND study of the B-1B bomber program concluded that an extraordinary amount 
of internal and external coordination was required, leading to a “ceaseless series of 
meetings, calls, and memos” (Bodilly, 1993, p. 40).  The study concluded that 14 different 
groups had major roles in the program.   
The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 Report (Murdock et al., 2005) stated that 
the “well-intentioned majority of the acquisition corps today faces two significant types of 
bureaucratic impediments: highly centralized oversight and conflicting guidance” (p. 91).  
The Phase 2 Report also found that program managers (PMs) and program executive 
officers (PEOs) are left with about 50% or less of their time to actually manage their 
programs (Murdock et al., 2005). 
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The highly regarded Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) report in 
2006 showed that 97% of the survey inputs received indicated that the current oversight and 
leadership process is deficient (Kadish et al., 2006).  Figure 1, from the DAPA report, 
highlights the key issues affecting government acquisitions.  As can be seen in the figure, 
respondents viewed oversight as the most prevalent issue. 
 
 Integrated Look at Key Issues 
(Kadish et al., 2006) 
Oversight is discussed in several sections of the DAPA report.  Figure 2 is a one-
page summary of the myriad DAPA findings with respect to oversight.  Issues relating to 
oversight are divided into four categories: Extent of Oversight, Programmatic Issues, 
Accountability/Authority Issues, and Effect on Progress. 
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 Summary of DAPA Report Findings on Oversight 
(extracted from Kadish et al., 2006) 
Lastly, Ford, Colburn, and Morris (2012) found that large programs and budgets, 
such as acquisition category (ACAT) 1 multi-year programs, are easy targets for increased 
Extent of oversight 
- Current oversight process is burdensome, ineffective, adds little value, and inhibits 
steady improvement 
Excessive numbers of reviews and oversight personnel; quantity replaced quality 
- Regulations written to implement policy are more stringent than the policy itself 
- Dissatisfact ion with sheer volume of acquisition JawsJ regulations, and policies 
- Rely on overlapping layers of reviews at the expense of focus and quality 
Programmatic Issues 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) designation process results in excessive number of 
programs requiring additional level of DAB approvalsJ causing excessive reporting 
requirements 
- Even with the laborious and extensive oversight, troubled programs still pass through 
Lack of continuity or attendance on OSD acquisition IPTs results in the re-emergence of 
issues previously resolved and revisiting decisions 
- Policy and guidance often conflict, resulting in ignoring policy or seeking legal advice 
- Inst itutional biases toward waiving or tailoring regulations (even though DoD Directives 
promote tailoring for each program's situation) 
Accountability/Authority Issues 
Oversight is preferred to accountability and based on a lack of trust 
- Oversight dilutes or eliminates accountability for program performance 
- PMseffectiveness is constrained by people who do not share responsibility or 
accountability 
OSD staff do not have decision-making authority or timely access to principal decision 
makers 
None of the review bodies are accountable for the impact of the changes they imposed 
Progress Suffers 
- Staffs allowed to assume de-facto pro,gram authority, stop progress and increase 
program scope 
Programs advance in spite of the oversight process rather than because of it 
- PM does not have authority to bypass a stakeholders "no" vote, programs progress held 
hostage 
Figure 2.
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oversight and longer approval chains.  They showed a positive correlation between program 
size (measured by budget dollars) and the extent of oversight.  
Factors Affecting the Level of Oversight 
A factor affecting one’s ability to manage oversight and stakeholders is political skill.  
Political skills include developing coalitions and gaining resources, assistance, and 
approvals from senior leaders and other relevant parties (Yukl, 2006).  Additionally, De Wit 
(1988, p. 167) stated, “political skill will be a useful attribute on the part of the project 
manager to assure maximum satisfaction among the stakeholders.  This is of special 
importance on public-sector projects.”  Furthermore, Yukl (2006) discusses five skills 
required for leading cross-functional teams (which includes integrated product teams [IPTs]).  
Specifically, political and interpersonal skills are associated with managing oversight and 
leading IPTs (Yukl, 2006).  These skills involve understanding the needs and values of 
stakeholders to influence them and resolve conflict.  In addition, a higher program 
classification can reduce oversight because it limits the number of people to those with the 
requisite security classification and need to know (Ford, Colburn, & Morris, 2012).   
Finally, the literature on DoD acquisitions points to four main areas that affect 
oversight (Pagliano & O’Rourke, 2004; Kadish et al, 2006).  The first factor affecting 
oversight is uncertainty.  If all else is constant, the greater the program uncertainty, the more 
extensive the oversight will be.  Second, oversight will increase as program criticality 
increases.  In other words, if a program is critical to national security, a high degree of 
oversight will exist.  Third, oversight will increase as trust decreases.  If the chain of 
command and external stakeholders do not have a high degree of trust in what the program 
office is doing, more external reviews and proof will be required from the program office, 
thus leading to more extensive oversight.  Finally, oversight will increase as the level of 
control and standardization from leaders increases.  A model was developed (Figure 3) from 
the review showing how various factors affect the level of oversight in a program.   
 
 Factors Affecting Level of Oversight 
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Methodology 
Research Design 
Theoretical Method 
This research utilized Grounded Theory Methods (GTM).  Auerbach and Silverstein 
(2003) suggest GTM when a researcher’s particular theory is at its early stage, not enough 
is known to state hypotheses prior to the investigation, and the major research involves 
identifying and categorizing elements to explore their connections.  One of the key tenets of 
GTM is the iterative process of collecting, coding, and interpreting the data, also known as 
analytic induction (Binder & Edwards, 2010).  As such, the interview process and data 
analysis were iterative in nature. 
Sample Size 
For the interview sample size, Eisenhardt (1989) states that 4–10 cases have 
worked well for most qualitative studies.  Separate research conducted by Ellram (1996) 
identifies 6–10 cases as sufficiently large for evaluation and empirical grounding.  Therefore, 
one-on-one interviews were conducted with 10 hand-picked senior acquisition leaders with 
diverse backgrounds and program experience.   
Sampling Strategy 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537) states that “random [case] selection is neither necessary, 
nor preferable” when building theory from case studies.  Both purposive and snowball 
sampling were used in this research.  Purposive sampling is used in qualitative research 
where individuals are selected based on their ability to better inform the researcher 
(Krathwohl, 1998; Patten, 2009).  Snowball sampling entails identifying future participants 
based on recommendations from past participants (Krathwohl, 1998).  In other words, the 
interviewees specifically suggest other people to interview.  Snowball sampling successfully 
led to three interviews. 
Personal Interviews 
The population for this research consisted of Air Force program managers (PMs) 
with at least 20 years of experience.  This included active duty and retired officers with ranks 
ranging from colonel to major general, active duty civilians with ranks ranging from GS-15 to 
Senior Executive Service (SES), and three government contractors.  Both Air Force product 
centers, the Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) and Space and Missile Systems 
Center (SMC), were represented, along with Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  
Programs covered included Global Positioning System (GPS), SOCOM Fixed Wing, 
Spacelift Range, Big Safari, F-22, Project Dragon Spear, Military Satellite Communications 
Directorate (MILSATCOM), FalconSAT, and the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
(SAF/AQ) and Aerospace organizations.   
Coding: Atlas.ti 
The ExpressScribe program was used to quickly transfer the interviews into 
Microsoft Word documents.  The interviews were then coded, categorized, and analyzed in 
ATLAS.ti, a software program specifically designed for qualitative research, using an “open 
coding” of labels to extract major themes.  All responses were analyzed for common 
themes.  Three rounds of analysis were conducted in ATLAS.ti. 
Survey 
Additionally, a survey was developed from the interview data and distributed to the 
interviewees as well as junior officers and civilians in the introductory Fundamentals of 
Acquisition Management (FAM) 103 and mid-level Intermediate Program Management 
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(IPM) 301 skills courses.  The survey contained 65 questions on a 1–5 Likert scale with an 
additional column for respondents to mark “unknown.”  Two classes from each course were 
surveyed.  Fifty-eight students in the FAM 103 courses and 35 students in the IPM 301 
courses provided usable surveys, totaling 93.  The survey served three purposes: 
1. Quantitatively validate interview responses with statistical significance 
2. Prioritize themes from senior leaders 
3. Identify knowledge gaps in the junior workforce 
According to Cohen (1992), for an alpha (α) level of 0.05 (a 95% confidence level) 
and a medium effect size, one must have a sample size of at least 85.  For a large effect 
size at the same confidence level, the sample size should be at least 28.  Therefore, a 
conservative sample size of at least 85 was the goal; 93 usable student surveys were 
completed along with the additional 10 from the senior leaders. 
Limitations/Assumptions 
The nature of qualitative data and grounded theory research allows for interpretation 
depending on the researcher’s point of view.  Qualitative analysis “can therefore become 
biased based on individual experience and perspective” (Ford et al., 2012).  The author 
endeavored to be cognizant of bias and avoid it when guiding interview discussions and 
interpreting, coding, and analyzing the data. 
The results will have a high degree of reliability for all DoD program managers, even 
though the population set was limited to Air Force program managers.  Studies have shown 
that all the Services are comparable with respect to their acquisition processes and record 
of success (Kadish et al., 2006; Burton, 1993).   
Analysis and Results 
Interview Analysis 
From three iterative rounds of coding the data, four themes and 12 sub-elements 
emerged as shown in Figure 4.   
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 ATLAS.ti Round 3 Results 
A co-occurrence table was developed analyzing where common occurrences within 
and between themes and codes occurred.  The strength of a co-occurrence is affected by 
the number of times a comment was made either during a single interview or between 
several interviews.  Strong and medium co-occurrences are collected and displayed in Table 
1, with the three key findings for this paper highlighted. 
 Strong and Medium Co-Occurrences Between Sub-Elements 
 
The interviews were also categorized based on the respondents with experience as 
a program director (PD) and those with experience in rapid acquisitions.  Five interviews 
were coded as those with PD experience and three interviews were coded as those with 
rapid acquisition experience.  Figure 5 graphically displays the focus areas between the two 
Break down barriers & build relationships strongly co‐occurs with External communications strategy
Break down barriers & build relationships strongly co‐occurs with Navigating oversight
Break down barriers & build relationships co‐occurs with Contractor relationships
Break down barriers & build relationships co‐occurs with Seeking waivers/tailoring regulations
External communications strategy co‐occurs with Efficiencies/time savers
External communications strategy co‐occurs with Seeking waivers/tailoring regulations
External communications strategy co‐occurs with Navigating oversight
Efficiencies/time savers co‐occurs with Navigating oversight
Enterprise risks co‐occurs with Working risks
Working risks co‐occurs with Management reserve principles
Strong Co‐occurrences
Medium Co‐occurrences
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groups.  Interestingly, the top three responses were the same for both groups.  These were 
the External Communications Strategy, Break Down Barriers and Build Relationships, and 
Navigating Oversight.  The main focus area for the program directors regarded their external 
communications strategies, which is understandable given the amount of oversight and 
number of stakeholders present in MDAP programs.  A great deal of time is spent ensuring 
goals and strategies are being communicated clearly, accurately, and in a timely manner 
across organizational boundaries.  Navigating Oversight was the second focus area for both 
program directors and those with rapid acquisition experience.  However, a key difference 
exists between the two groups.  Program directors’ practices relating to oversight involved 
how to efficiently and effectively work through the current oversight and regulations.  The 
oversight was viewed more as a fact of life that had to be worked through.  In contrast, rapid 
acquisition responses focused more on how to circumvent the oversight from the start.  In 
other words, rather than trying to efficiently work through oversight, rapid acquisition 
organizations delegate approvals and obtain waivers from the beginning (the thesis contains 
a case study on how USSOCOM instantly tailors 5000.02 via SOCOM Directive 70-1).  
Accepting the oversight level and figuring out how best to navigate it is very different than 
navigating oversight by avoiding the oversight from the beginning. 
 
 Histogram Comparing PD and Rapid Experience Responses 
Additionally, a significant difference also existed between the PD and rapid 
experience responses for Seeking Waivers/Tailoring Regulations.  Rapid acquisition 
organizations spend a lot of effort on tailoring programs and obtaining waivers.  However, 
program directors often viewed the process of obtaining a waiver as more difficult than 
actually complying with the guidance, even if it did not make sense for the program.  
Therefore, program tailoring was a larger focus area for those with rapid acquisition 
experience.  Figure 6 provides a decision-making process to obtain a waiver/tailoring based 
on the interviews in the “Seeking Waivers/Tailoring Regulations” sub-element. 
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 Decision-Making Process to Obtain a Waiver/Tailoring 
Survey Analysis 
Table 2 shows the overall survey data results divided into junior-level and senior-
level responses.  Of particular note for the results discussion is the percentage of “unknown” 
responses from students in each sub-element, some of which were unexpected. 
 Overall Survey Results 
 
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each sub-element.  Both Break 
Down Barriers and Build Relationships and Navigating Oversight showed ANOVA 
significance at the 98% confidence level.  Normality is required from both groups for a valid 
ANOVA test.  Normality can be assumed for the students’ responses because a random 
sample of 93 data points was collected and used (normality requires at least 30 data points 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= - 179 - 
=
collected at random from the population; McClave, Benson, & Sincich, 2010).  However, 
because only 10 data points were used for the senior leaders group, a Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality was conducted on the three sub-elements with significant results.  Navigating 
Oversight showed normality by having a Shapiro-Wilk value greater than 0.05.  Initially, 
normality was not shown for the Break Down Barriers and Build Relationships sub-element, 
but after investigation one survey response was removed with high confidence that the 
respondent accidentally reverse coded one of the questions (answered 1 instead of 5 on the 
Likert scale) based on their interview remarks.  After this was done, this sub-element passed 
the Shapiro-Wilk test, showing normality as well.    
Overview of Theme and Sub-Element Results 
The three key sub-elements were pulled from the results and are presented next.  
Figures 7–9 give an overall assessment for each sub-element.  The overall assessment 
consists of two parts.  A qualitative assessment rating of 1 to 5 is given based on the 
interviews and ATLAS.ti analysis (consistency and quantity of quotes, importance placed on 
quotes, number of co-occurrences, strength of co-occurrences, and other subjective 
measures).  Additionally, quantitative top-level survey results are provided.  The average 
response is on a 1 to 5 Likert scale from the survey, and the percent unknown is the percent 
of respondents that marked unknown for questions relating to each particular sub-element.  
Lastly, a “Yes” or “No” is given if the ANOVA test between the Junior and Senior responses 
for that sub-element was significant.   
Theme 1 Sub-Element 1: Break Down Barriers and Build Relationships 
 
 Overall Assessment for Theme 1 Sub-Element 1 
 Building personal, trusting relationships requires consistency and stability 
 Importance of following through on your word 
 Importance of networking plus solid rationale 
 Returning un-executable money builds trust in large programs 
Building relationships and trust was the most commonly vocalized point throughout 
the interviews when discussing how best to navigate oversight or obtain a waiver or 
tailoring.  Building and maintaining strong, trusting relationships with peers, co-workers, 
superiors, stakeholders, and various members of oversight is a continual process built over 
time.  Trust is increased when project members follow through on their word.  Although 
intuitive, the importance of doing what you say you will do, when you said you would do it, 
should not be undervalued.   
Personal relationships with a high degree of trust require consistency and stability, 
which is often lacking in major acquisition programs.  Air Force military PM tenure is typically 
a three-year tour for the actual materiel leader billet.  Below the PM level, military acquisition 
Qualitative Assessment: 5
Survey Results:    
   Junior:     Senior:  
Avg response: 3.75 4.40 
% Unknown: 7.3% N/A 
ANOVA Significant?  Yes 
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officers and engineers are usually in a program for two years and then do a permanent 
change of assignment (PCA) in which they switch jobs, which can be within the same 
program office or not.  Even if military members prefer to stay in their assignments, it may 
not be good for their career to do so.  The two years does not include any training, 
continuous learning, deployments, or additional duties the member might need to complete.  
One PM the author previously worked with stated the turnover issue clearly.  Simply put, 
they lost half their people every summer, and that was a best case scenario.  Worst case, 
they had a complete turnover one year in which no military continuity existed in a major 
ACAT I program.  Stability and consistency, and the resultant trust and relationships, are 
constricted by the acquisition assignments process.   Alternatively, organizations with a rich 
history and culture, such as Big Safari, with only three or four directors in the past 60 years, 
allow for close, personal relationships to be cultivated over time.   
Networking is extremely vital to get one’s issue “brought to the table.”  As one 
respondent mentioned, “I would have never been promoted once in my life if it wasn’t about 
relationships …. I built relationships, I knew what people wanted, I knew the people to rely 
on, I did the extra thing, so relationship-building in that oversight process is instrumental.”  
Networking builds trust by building closer relationships.  This in turn increases the likelihood 
for a program approval, waiver, or tailoring.  However, some negative aspects of networking 
were cited in the interviews as well.  When one becomes more senior and is on their second 
or third tour at the same base, the people who have previously known them may still view 
them as their company grade officer (CGO) friend and not show the requisite respect.  
Additionally, past co-workers may not be as concerned about deadlines because they have 
a personal relationship with the senior.  Last, the ease of recognizing “phony networking” 
was cited in a couple interviews, which is when one realizes someone is building a 
relationship solely for their own benefit.  Although drawbacks to networking exist, the 
positive aspects far outweigh the drawbacks.   
Building relationships is enabled by knowing what you are doing.  Even if all the 
previous statements were true, if the rationale for what you are trying to do is flimsy, trust 
and networking will be far less effective.  Having solid rationale in your decision-making is a 
key enabler to building trust because others may not want to enable members of their own 
network to assist in doing something that does not make sense if it will result in a lower trust 
level for them.  As one respondent discussed, “Having a sense of purpose, knowing what 
you’re trying to do, and having strong rationale communicates a message much better.”   
Lastly, returning un-executable money builds trust in large programs, if they are 
behind schedule and must do so.  The money must be returned through the PEO, not 
directly to Air Force or other channels.  Returning un-executable money does not include 
“expired” funds.   
In this sub-element, the responses between the students and senior leaders were 
significantly different.  The mean of the senior responses was 4.40 compared to a mean of 
3.75 for students.  As was briefed to each FAM and IPM class, the senior leaders 
emphasized and put much more value on relationship-building, building trust, and 
networking than did the students.  The takeaway for the students is that as they are starting 
out or continuing their careers, they should begin building relationships with folks in required 
trainings, other programs, outside of work, etc., to expand their network.  Of course, this 
cannot be done from a selfish or “further myself” point of view, but rather should be 
genuinely for the benefit of all.   
In summary, as one respondent discussed, “What do I do to navigate [oversight]?  I 
try to break down those barriers as much as possible.  I really try to build relationships with 
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people, so that they know if something is really bugging them they can give me a call so we 
can talk back and forth.” 
Theme 1 Sub-Element 2: External Communications Strategy 
 
 Overall Assessment for Theme 1 Sub-Element 2 
 “Walking the building” every time 
 Benefits of physical communications 
 “Ground swell” or “burning your boots”  
 Value of an elevator speech 
 Knowing and communicating the “views of others”   
 Ability to communicate across paradigms 
Once a decision is made as to the strategy on an issue, how the PM externally 
communicates and “sells” what they’re doing is very important.  Several interviewees 
provided approaches they take.  These include “walking the building” each time the PM is at 
the Pentagon, physical communications, and “ground swell” or “burning your boots” 
(proactive staff communication and dissemination of program strategies).  Also, the value of 
an elevator speech, knowing the “views of others,” and the ability to communicate across 
paradigms all go a long way toward effectively communicating what the program is trying to 
accomplish.  Additionally, this sub-element had over a 2:1 ratio of responses from program 
directors versus respondents with rapid experience.  In general, those with PD experience 
put much more emphasis into the importance and value of communicating what they are 
doing.  The likely reason for this is because large ACAT I programs experience much more 
oversight (due to the multi-year, high-dollar value, and industry and congressional 
stakeholders) than smaller, more rapid programs.  However, in ACAT I programs, decision-
making and oversight require more stakeholder analysis and often consist of a “one-shot” 
opportunity to obtain program approvals, thus leading to the higher importance of the 
program’s external communications strategy from program directors. 
Several respondents mentioned how they “walk the building” when they are visiting 
Washington, DC.  This term is used to describe how a PM should visit key stakeholders, 
members of oversight, and members of their network when walking around the Pentagon.  
In particular, they should do this each time they are there, especially when nothing is 
needed from the people they are visiting.  Visiting offices and asking folks if they need 
anything from you helps build trust and, with noble intent all along, can enable reciprocal 
generosity when you need something from them.  In other words, a genuine, proactive offer 
to help others without any expectation for them to reciprocate in the future is an effective 
communication strategy to build long-term relationships.  
Qualitative Assessment: 5
Survey Results:  
    Junior:  Senior:  
Avg response: 4.09 4.5 
% Unknown: 1.9% N/A 
ANOVA Significant?  No 
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Additionally, physical communications are far better than electronic means.  Physical 
communications enable one to match a face with a name, increase the importance of the 
issue (if one flies to discuss an issue rather than e-mailing or calling, they are putting higher 
importance on the issue), and make it more difficult to ignore the issue.  Ignoring an e-mail 
is fairly easy and ignoring a phone call is not much harder.  However, when someone 
physically visits you to discuss an issue, and then comes back to discuss the results, it is far 
more difficult to ignore that person’s requests.   
Another way to externally communicate a strategy is by “ground swell” or “burning 
your boots.”  This refers to the program staff, predominantly the Program Element Monitor 
(PEM), proactively communicating and disseminating the strategy and goals throughout the 
myriad program stakeholders in Washington, DC.  This is done by working the staffing and 
issues from the ground up, communicating to all stakeholders and staffs first so that there 
are no surprises and so that any possible issues are brought to light early on.  As one 
respondent mentioned, “really good action officer work can save hours upon hours of 
wasted time in meetings.”   
Business, organizational behavior, and management books often discuss the 
importance of an elevator speech (albeit using different terms).  The premise is that if you 
were to find yourself riding in an elevator with a senior manager, you should always have a 
short (~1–2 minute) speech or talking points in mind to gain the senior manager’s support in 
the time it takes to ride in the elevator.  Interviewees discussed the importance of this 
concept in acquisitions as well, with some discussing the value of a hard-hitting one-liner.  
PMs need to have a short, direct, and effective means to communicate the program 
capability and its vital importance without going into highly technical or programmatic details.  
As one respondent said, “When I was having a problem getting funding for xx program, I 
met with a key staffer.  I said to him ‘Do you want our enemies to be able to launch a nuke 
at us and we’re not able to detect it early enough to destroy it?”’ ‘Well, no.’  ‘This program 
ensures early warning to protect the homeland.  Period.’”  These statements should be clear 
and concise to the maximum extent possible.  An excellent one-liner can be crucial for three 
reasons: 
1. if one unexpectedly has a moment of the senior’s time; 
2. to translate a technical program into a tangible, national security issue; and 
3. in helping the oversight help the program. 
Staff Summary Sheets (SSS) have a section in which the “views of others” can be 
documented.  The purpose is to provide any differing views amongst various stakeholders, 
specifically influential stakeholders, when staffing a package.  Bringing contentious 
viewpoints to the table early in the process has several benefits. It allows you to 
1. take the time to grasp the heart of an issue and what you want to transmit, 
2. clearly articulate your position, and 
3. clearly articulate the views of others. 
Once this is done, the package gets sent up the chain.  The structure of an SSS 
allows for clear communications on paper rather than dealing with the myriad information, or 
often mis-information (as one respondent discussed), that goes through e-mail.  Additionally, 
“if you don’t accept or work those views of others from the get go, by the time you end up 
briefing your leadership, and then your leadership’s leadership, you end up entrenched in a 
position and you end up entrenched so much that it’s hard to walk backwards from anymore.  
So it removes your flexibility from a compromise or otherwise.”  Although it often works out 
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in the end, it can be quite painful to go back several layers in the staffing process and the 
resultant coordination change when a relatively small or easy change could have been 
accomplished, provided it was worked up front.   
When discussing how best to communicate or “sell” an issue, it is very important to 
communicate across paradigms.  Providing information in a way that program managers, 
users, budgeters, engineers, and senior leaders in oversight all understand will help prevent 
confusion and delays, particularly in the staffing process.  Similar to knowing your audience 
when giving a briefing, generally it is beneficial for a PM to know the audience for each 
particular briefing, meeting, and document and tailor the product to the audience.  A briefing 
inundated with technical jargon and specifications is probably not best when providing 
program status to the user or a senior leader. 
Theme 2 Sub-Element 3: Navigating Oversight 
 
 Overall Assessment for Theme 2 Sub-Element 3 
 Pick and choose battles while preventing “blood in the water” 
 Acquisition oversight lacks government PM experience 
 Reduce oversight by executing the plan 
 Smartly defend program budgets 
This sub-element discusses creative practices in working with oversight.  Current 
oversight also has several shortcomings.  To be expected, senior leaders had a significant 
difference in responses to the importance of navigating oversight than did students.  Seniors 
placed more emphasis on how to creatively navigate oversight, especially the subset of 
senior leaders with program director experience.   
First, acquisition experience is lacking in acquisition oversight positions.  Political 
appointees often come from industry, but as one respondent commented, “I’ve been to all 
the schools you’re supposed to, and they always talk about how industry does things.  
Industry and government are simply very different, and the same approaches will not work 
for both.”  Respondents also noted that the inexperience results in a lack of urgency.  
Techniques to work with inexperienced oversight include clearly making your case for what 
you are doing and laying out when a decision must be made (and the rationale and 
outcomes if a decision is not made by then).  If this does not work, allies either up the chain 
or in other oversight positions must be gained to defend and promote your position.  An 
operations advocate at the MAJCOM or HQ level was cited as an extremely 
beneficial/influential ally.  Operations advocates will defend the program’s requirements, 
criticality, and need as the user, rather than the program office defending its own jobs.    
Qualitative Assessment: 5
Survey Results:  
    Junior: Senior:  
Avg response: 3.55 4.06 
% Unknown: 19.5% N/A 
ANOVA Significant?    Yes 
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Also, one way to reduce program oversight is to reduce the ACAT level of the 
program whenever possible.  For example, ten $100 million programs have much fewer 
reporting requirements than one $1 billion program.  This will allow each program to be 
smaller and leaner, and have less oversight (all else held equal).  One ACAT 1D program 
noted how the documentation requirements for a milestone review have become 
debilitating—96 documents containing 12,000+ pages.  As the literature review showed, 
increasing a program’s classification level reduces oversight as well.  However, both a 
program’s classification and ACAT level are determined by either law (for the ACAT level) or 
strict policies (classification level); therefore, a PM has little authority to change these after 
program conception. 
When navigating oversight, PMs must pick and choose their battles on the few 
issues on which they are not willing to compromise.  This will reinforce to the community 
what is not negotiable from the PM’s point of view.  Correlated to this, one must prevent 
“blood in the water” during decision reviews.  This refers to a stakeholder or staff member 
attacking controversial issues of the program during a meeting.  The PM must directly and 
convincingly quell these arguments so that other stakeholders do not latch on, much like 
sharks when there’s blood in the water.  For example, if a stakeholder questions the 
reasoning for the contract type in the acquisition strategy, the PM should then and there 
explain why it is the best contract type and incentive structure for the program.  A hesitant 
answer or having to get back to the stakeholder later allows for other stakeholders to look 
into the issue and lose confidence in the PM having the requisite control and understanding 
of the program.  Of course, this needs to be tempered with difficult, unforeseen questions 
that do not have a known answer.  In these (hopefully rare) cases, a PM should promise to 
get back to the person as quickly as possible.  In summary, keeping the “blood out of the 
water” can be immensely beneficial. 
Practices in which programs defend their budgets (with integrity) reduce program 
oversight as well.  The best way to defend against budget cuts and reduce intervention is 
simply to stay green—obligate and expend money on time.  Second, programs should make 
every effort to fund disconnects internally, as no one ever wants to ask for more money (nor 
is it currently available).  The 19.5% unknown responses from students in this sub-element 
arise predominantly from this survey question.  Surprisingly, 40% of students did not know if 
programs should fund disconnects internally to the maximum extent possible.  Therefore, it 
is recommended that the appropriate continuing education course expand the teaching on 
how PMs can avoid program interference by smartly managing funds internally.  Although 
this is of particular value to program directors, PMs at all levels can still learn from this 
heuristic and do what they can to manage funds allowing for some degree of flexibility.  
Third, perceptions are worse than reality in many areas of government acquisitions.  If a 
program is perceived to be fat (over-funded) or behind schedule, whether it is true or not, 
the program is a more apt candidate for cuts.   
Also, when hiring a material leader, some programs may find it highly beneficial to 
hire one with recent PEM experience.  For example, a pre-Milestone B program (even 
though it is not technically called a program yet) will experience numerous decision reviews, 
staffing, and oversight during the Milestone B and source selection processes.  Recent PEM 
experience greatly increases the process familiarity and likelihood that recent relationships 
will prove useful in working the system. 
Conclusions 
In review, the predominant finding of this research is that senior acquisition 
professionals believe that relationships and building trust are of paramount importance.  A 
high correlation exists between three main sub-elements: Break Down Barriers and Build 
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Relationships, External Communications Strategy, and Navigating Oversight.  The first two 
are vital to effectively and efficiently navigating oversight.  Both program directors and 
respondents with rapid experience chose these three sub-elements as their top three 
responses.     
For Navigating Oversight, program directors more often accepted the level of 
oversight as a fact of life, so they work hard to efficiently work with and through the oversight 
for program success.  However, rapid acquisition organizations navigated the oversight 
process by delegating approval authorities and tailoring programs from the start, thus 
avoiding a degree of oversight from the beginning. 
Additionally, junior personnel did not believe the relationships nor the oversight 
aspects to be as important as the senior leaders judged.  Therefore, an opportunity exists 
for DAU or AFIT classes to bolster the material relating to these topics.  This is especially 
important not only because the senior leaders attribute success to these areas, but because 
relationships can be built over a career and the process of building relationships can begin 
at the start of one’s acquisition journey. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The following are recommendations for future research.  Future research can be 
accomplished to investigate the root cause of the significant differences shown between 
introductory, mid-level, and senior acquisition professionals, both for differences in the Likert 
scale responses and for questions with a significant number of “unknown” responses.  
Additionally, the same thesis methodology could be applied to industry program managers 
to assess the external validity of this research to industry.   
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